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States with income taxes frequently exempt municipal bond interest from state taxation. 
Such exemptions, referred to as double exempts, are tax expenditures that reduce state 
revenues, but are viewed as a subsidy to the cost of capital for the state and its localities. 
All but a few states provide the income tax exemption for state based issues while taxing 
interest from municipal bonds issued by muni issuers in other states. A recent court case, 
Davis vs. Department of Revenue of Kentucky, declared state statutes limiting the state 
income tax exemptions to ”in-state” issues unconstitutional.  This paper provides some 
legal background and context for the current case and addresses two key fiscal 
implications of this case. First, the paper presents a basic model that suggests that bonds 
issued by states with higher marginal tax rates would see the yields increase on their 
obligations while states with lower than average marginal tax rates would see their yields 
decline. The yields would converge at new market equilibrium due to the elimination of 
tax preferences across the states. Second, the preliminary estimates suggest a good deal 
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In recent decades, state and local governments have increasingly turned to
bonds or debt ﬁnancing to ﬁnance their capital budgets. As a result, the
issuance of tax-exempt municipal bonds has grown to meet state and lo-
cal government capital investment needs. The growth of the tax exempt
market has resulted in federal tax expenditures of approximately $32 billion
dollars. Outstanding municipal issues are estimated to be approximately
$2.3 trillion.1 States with income taxes also frequently exempt municipal
bond interest from state taxation. Such exemptions, referred to as double
exempts, are tax expenditures that reduce state revenues, but are viewed
as a subsidy to the cost of capital for the state and its localities. The po-
tential state revenue loss resulting from the state income tax exemption has
been partially mitigated by prevailing state policies that grant the state in-
come exemption only for those issues emanating from issuing entities within
their state. In other words, states have provided the income tax exemption
for state based issues while taxing interest from municipal bonds issued by
muni issuers in other states. A recent court case, Davis vs. Department
of Revenue of Kentucky, declared state statutes limiting the state income
tax exemptions to “in-state” issues unconstitutional. Based on the “dor-
mant” commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals found that treating non-state issues diﬀerently from state based is-
sues was an infringement on interstate commerce which is prohibited by the
Commerce clause. This paper considers the impact of this ruling on state
revenues and the municipal bond markets.
1.1 Background
Bond ﬁnancing of state and local government capital budgets has become
the “industry standard” in recent decades. The use of bond sale proceeds
to fund capital budgets has emerged for several reasons including its use as
means of managing the “lumpiness” of major capital projects and responding
to the pressure of maintaining infrastructure investments during periods of
limited resources, among others. The use of debt ﬁnancing has also been
justiﬁed on the “beneﬁts received principle,” which suggests that the cost
of state and local capital and infrastructure investments should be borne by
the citizens that beneﬁt from such investments in public capital. As most
1Bond Market Association as reported in The Wall Street Journal. Herman, Tom,
2006, “Kentucky Muni-Bond Case May Have Broad Reach” The Wall Street Journal, D2,
Wednesday, September 6, 2006.
1capital investments provide beneﬁts over several years, it is argued that bond
ﬁnancing provides an opportunity to match capital costs to capital project
beneﬁts.
While the increased reliance on bond ﬁnancing has been justiﬁed in a
number of ways, the attractiveness of this capital ﬁnancing alternative has
been enhanced by the long-standing capital subsidy emanating from the tax-
exempt status of municipal bonds. The capital cost reductions that result
from the exemption of municipal bond interest from federal and state income
taxes provides an additional reason for greater state and local government
use of this capital budget funding source. The growth of municipal bond
issuance and bond market is evidenced by the number of investors in muni
bonds (estimated to be approximately 4.4 million federal taxpayers in 2004)
as well as the interest income earned from muni bonds, which the Internal
Revenue Service estimates to be in the $50 billion dollar range in the same
year2 The exemption of the municipal bond interest from the federal income
which has existed since the passage of the 16th amendment and the enact-
ment of the current federal income tax is not without its critics. At various
times during the previous century, the exemption of municipal bond interest
has come under attack by various federal oﬃcials. They have expressed con-
cern about the tax expenditure impact and/or federal tax revenue loss which
has resulted from the exemption. Meanwhile, states with personal income
taxes have also exempted interest income on muni bonds issued by the state
and its political subdivisions (including localities) within their state while
taxing interest income ﬂowing from municipal bonds issued by muni issuing
entities of other states. The double exemption (from both federal and state
income taxes) has enhanced the marketability of muni issues and has acted
as a capital subsidy for state and local government entities. In some cities,
such as New York, municipal bond holders beneﬁt from a triple exemption
if both a state and the cities within the state have enacted personal income
taxes.
1.2 The Davis v. Department of Revenue Case
A recent case in Kentucky, Davis v. Department of Revenue3, has chal-
lenged the ability of Kentucky to exempt in-state municipal bond interest
while taxing interest received by state residents that hold munis issued by
entities of other states. In the case, the Kentucky Appeals Court ruled that
2Herman, Tom, 2006, “Tax Report: Kentucky Muni-Bond Case May Have Broad
Reach” The Wall Street Journal, D2, Wednesday, September 6, 2006.
3Davis v. Department of Revenue, 2004-CA-001940-MR
2it is unconstitutional for Kentucky to tax interest earned on out-of-state
issues while exempting interest earned on in-state muni bonds. The ruling
was based on the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution which gives
the federal government authority to regulate commerce between and among
states and foreign countries. The Kentucky Supreme Court let the ruling
stand by choosing not to review the case.
The Kentucky Department of Revenue has applied for a writ of certiorari
from the U.S. Supreme Court.4 At this time, it is not clear whether the
Supreme Court will approve the request as a limited number of petitions
for cert. are honored by the court each year (approximately 80 out of 7,500
petitions). Among the factors normally considered by the Court in granting
such requests are whether the case 1) involves a question of law rather than
law and fact, 2) there is a conﬂict among lower courts regarding the meaning
of the law and 3) a lower court produced a faulty conclusion. The outcome
of this case is presently unclear. However, if the Supreme Court hears and
sustains the Kentucky Court of Appeals opinion, the position in the opinion
will become the law of the land, binding on all federal and state courts. This
in turn will probably lead to standardization of state laws regarding the
preferential tax treatment of municipal bond interest. This paper reviews
the history of the federal and state exemptions and considers the potential
impact of such an outcome on the muni bond market. Then we examine the
potential implications of the case on the cost of capital for state and local
governments.
2 Court Cases Involving Tax Exemption of Mu-
nicipal Bonds
The most recent court case heard by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in-
volving the state exemption of municipal bonds follows a number of other
important court cases concerning the exemption of interest from municipal
bonds at both the state and federal level.
2.1 Federal exemption for state and local bond interest
Interest earned from bonds issued by states and localities has been exempt
from federal taxation from the inception of the current federal income tax in
1913 (Sixteenth Amendment). However, prior to the sixteenth amendment,
there were periods where taxes were levied on income as well as personal
4U.S. S. Ct., Dkt. No. 06-666, 11/29/2006
3property. The legal question of whether bonds issued by states and localities
could be taxed by the federal government precedes the enactment of the
sixteenth amendment.
The traditional thought, and earliest precedent, with regard to the tax
exemption of municipal bonds at the federal level goes back to McCulloch
v. Maryland.5 According to Tucker6 this case, which was decided in 1819,
established the “doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.” The issue
at hand was whether or not Maryland could tax a bank chartered by the
United States.7 The U.S. Supreme court ruled that the Maryland did not
have power to tax the notes issued by the bank in question. Tucker notes,
“In the succeeding years the principle of federal immunity was enlarged and
expanded, but it was not until 1870 that the converse situation arose and a
federal tax was questioned because it applied to an instrumentality of the
state.”8 Through this “doctrine” it became established that one level of
government could not impose a direct tax on another level of government.
This idea was ﬁrst applied to salary earned by an employee of the state
(Collector v. Day9) and later was applied to municipal securities. The
prevailing logic was that municipal securities are issued by the state and
therefore a tax on the security was a tax on the state. McCulloch is widely
seen as the precedent for the Federal exemption of municipal bonds from
taxation.10
This line of reasoning was strengthened in a case brought before the
United States Supreme court in 1895. The case, Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan &
Trust Co.,11 disputed a recently passed federal income tax and was centrally
focused on whether the burden of this tax was directly apportioned among
the states. Another issue, according to Zimmerman (1991), was that “this
tax also provided an exclusion for interest on U.S government obligations
and not those of state or local governments.”12 The US Supreme Court
found that the income tax violated the rule of direct apportionment and
5McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)
6Tucker, Robert H, 1940, “Some Aspects of Intergovernmental Tax Exemption,” South-
ern Economic Journal, 6(3): 273-290
7Wallace, M.G., 1919, “Taxation by the States of United States Bonds Held by Cor-
porations,” Virginia Law Review, 6(1):20-27.
8Tucker 283-284
9The Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113 (1870)
10For example, Fisher, Ronald C., 2007, State & Local Public Finance, Third Edition,
Thomson South-Western: US, pgs 240-1; Zimmerman, Dennis, 1991, The private use of
tax-exempt bonds, The Urban Institute Press: Washington D.C., pgs 41-2.
11Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)
12Zimmerman 42
4also that the tax on state and local bond interest was “repugnant to the
constitution.” This case touched on the taxation of municipal bonds in
aﬃrming that a tax levied on municipal bonds was unconstitutional.
From the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment to the present, there has
been continual debate regarding the exemption of municipal bonds from
federal taxation.13 When congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act (TEFRA) in 1982 the tax treatment of municipal bonds
was a central issue. Congress desired to increase their ability to track who
was holding municipal bonds and crack down on any fraud. TEFRA re-
moved the tax exemption for municipal bonds unless they were issued in
registered form. In South Carolina V. Baker,14 the state of South Carolina
challenged the notion that the Federal government could tax their munici-
pal bonds at all. They speciﬁcally thought that TEFRA violated the 10th
amendment and intergovernmental tax immunity established in Pollock al-
most 100 years earlier. The US Supreme Court noted in their decision that
Pollock had been overturned piece by piece over the previous century and
that state bond interest is not immune from nondiscriminatory federal taxa-
tion. This veriﬁed the right of the Federal government to tax interest earned
from bonds regardless of issuer.
Since South Carolina v. Baker, municipal bonds have been issued in
registered form in order to obtain the exemption from federal taxation. The
amount of revenue that the federal government will forgo this year due to
this tax preference is estimated, by the Oﬃce of Management and the Bud-
get,15 to be $28 billion (includes exemptions for individuals and corporations
holding tax-exempt bonds). It is clear that if the federal government chose
to start taxing municipal bonds, there would be a substantial amount of
revenue collected.16
13For a more complete discussion see Pryde, Joan, 1993, “The ongoing battle: Almost
70 years of assaults on Tax-exempt municipals,” In The Handbook of municipal bonds
and public ﬁnance eds. R. Lamb, J. Leigland, and S. Rappaport, New York Institute of
Finance: New York.
14South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988)
15Oﬃce of Management and the Budget, 2006, Analytical Perspective, Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007, US Government Printing Oﬃce: Washing-
ton, pg. 289.
16These estimates do not account for any change in behavior that would occur if these
municipal bonds lost their tax exemption. As demonstrated later in the paper, the in-
centives that individuals have to hold these bonds could be reduced if Davis v. Dept of
Revenue is not overturned and states respond by taxing all muni bonds.
52.2 State exemption of its own bond interest
The taxation of other state’s bonds while exempting one’s own bonds is a
more recent legal issue. Prior to the Kentucky case, the Court of Appeals
of Ohio aﬃrmed in Shaper v. Tracy17 that the state of Ohio could treat its
bonds diﬀerently than other states’ bonds with respect to taxation. Further-
more, this court claimed that “neither the Supreme Court nor any case law
examined has applied the Commerce Clause to a case such as this, where one
governmental entity is taxing its residents for the interest earned on bonds
issued by another governmental entity.”18 According to their research, this
was the ﬁrst court case to address the legality of the tax preference for one’s
own bonds. The case was appealed to US Supreme Court and the appeal
was not heard.
In Davis v. Department of Revenue, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
examined the two key issues of the case: the constitutionality of Kentucky’s
tax treatment of interest earned from bonds issued by Kentucky and those
issued by other states and the standing of the Davises.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Davis, mentioned that the Depart-
ment of Revenue’s argument for the constitutionality of the diﬀerent tax
treatment relies heavily on the Shaper case. The Kentucky Court found
that the “[Ohio] court failed fully to analyze the issue.” The speciﬁc criti-
cism is that the Ohio court found the tax preference constitutional simply
because there were no prior rulings to the contrary (Davis v. Department
of Revenue). Having dismissed Shaper, the Kentucky Court looked beyond
Shaper at the other arguments made by the Department with regard to
other aspects of the Commerce Clause. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
concluded that
“Having found the Department’s arguments are unavailing, we
are left with a situation in which Kentucky’s bond taxation
scheme is facially unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause...
we have no choice but to ﬁnd that Kentucky’s system of tax-
ing only extraterritorial bonds runs afoul the Commerce Clause.
Thus, the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment to
the Department was erroneous.”19
As mentioned above, the Kentucky Supreme court has decided not to
hear an appeal of this case and the Kentucky Department of Revenue has
17Shaper v. Tracy, 97 Ohio App.3d 760, 647 N.E.2d 550 (1994)
18Shaper v. Tracy
19Davis v. Department of Revenue
6applied for a writ of certiorari to the US Supreme Court in an eﬀort to
overturn the appeals court position.
2.3 Related issues involving the Dormant Commerce Clause
Challenging Kentucky’s taxation of other state bonds as a violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause, puts the case of Davis v. Department of Rev-
enue in a class of recent litigation that could have widespread eﬀects on state
and local governments’ ability to ﬁnance infrastructure and economic devel-
opment programs. Because the Commerce Clause of the Constitution gives
congress power to regulate interstate commerce, the Dormant Commerce
Clause restricts states from imposing taxes on interstate commerce that dis-
criminate against other states. Hellerstein and Coenen provide an extensive
overview of the legal issues involving the Dormant Commerce Clause and
the use of tax incentives and subsidies.20
DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno,21 a case recently argued before the US Supreme
Court, focused on the Dormant Commerce Clause. The case revolved around
the legality of tax incentives given to DaimlerChrysler to build a new Jeep
production facility in Toledo. The legal issue was never resolved in the case
because the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiﬀs did not have standing
to bring the case and at the same time they did not directly address the
issue of the tax incentives.
3 Kentucky response to Davis v. Department of
Revenue
To begin assessing the impact of the court ruling, a helpful starting point
may be the current tax treatment of bonds issued by Kentucky state and
local governments and currently held by Kentuckians. Essential in the as-
sessment is how a potential change in exemption status could aﬀect the
yield of Kentucky’s municipal bonds relative to municipal bonds issued by
entities of other states as well as taxable bonds. The diﬀerence in the yield
among the state’s municipal bonds, other states’ municipal bonds, and tax-
able bonds will aﬀect investors’ decisions of which bonds to invest in at
the margin. The following equation relates the yield of a municipal bond,
exempt from both federal and state taxation, to that of a taxable bond.
20Hellerstein, Walter and Dan T. Coenen. (1996) “Commerce Clause Restraints on
State Business Development Incentives” Cornell Law Review 81: 789-875
21DaimlerChrysler Corporation v. Cuno, Docket Number: 04-1724
7Y ieldtax−exempt = Y ieldtaxable(1 − [tf + ts − tstf]) (1)
Where tf is an individual’s marginal federal tax rate and ts is the indi-
vidual’s marginal state tax rate. . If an individual invests in a taxable bond,
their yield is reduced by the taxation of the interest earned at both the fed-
eral and state level. The eﬀective yield of the taxable bond is lower than the
stated yield due to taxation. For Kentuckians investing in Kentucky bonds,
the potential beneﬁt of these bonds is clear.
If Kentuckians invest in other state’s municipal bonds, then they only
realize the federal exemption of interest as seen below:
Y ieldtax−exempt = Y ieldtaxable(1 − tf) (2)
Under the current system, given two identical municipal bonds (with
equal yields), one issued by Kentucky and the other not, it is clearly ad-
vantageous for Kentuckians to invest in Kentucky bonds. Again, assuming
that the court decision forces Kentucky to treat all municipal bonds the
same with respect to taxation, they will have to exempt all municipal bonds
from state taxation as in the ﬁrst equation or subject all municipal bonds
to taxation as in second equation.
If the Supreme Court hears and upholds the Kentucky Court of Appeals
position and Kentucky responds by are exempting all municipal bonds from
taxation (as in equation 1), Kentucky begins to subsidize the capital projects
of other states and non-Kentucky bonds will become equally attractive as are
Kentucky bonds to Kentucky investors. The non-Kentucky bonds would now
have a higher eﬀective yield to residents than previously due to the extended
tax beneﬁt of the state exemption. Where under the current system the
eﬀective yield of a Kentucky bond is higher than an equivalent non Kentucky
bond, a change to total exemption for municipal bonds would eliminate this
yield diﬀerence thus making non-Kentucky bonds relatively more attractive
than currently.
If Kentucky responds to a potential Supreme Court ruling by taxing all
municipal bonds as in equation 2, the Kentucky bonds become relatively less
attractive than currently compared to other non-Kentucky municipal bonds.
The eﬀective yield of the Kentucky bonds is reduced by the preferential state
treatment (ts(1−tf)). The elimination of this tax preference simply reduces
the attractiveness of Kentucky bonds relative to non-Kentucky bonds.
In either scenario, high yield bonds from other states become more
attractive to Kentuckians than Kentucky bonds. The demand for these
Kentucky bonds would decrease and Kentuckians would demand more of
8other high yield muni bonds as illustrated below. The potential eﬀects of
a Supreme Court endorsement of the Kentucky Court of Appeals can also
be represented graphically. Figures 1 and 2 portray the bond demand and
price eﬀects of a change in Kentucky municipal bond taxing policy where




The demand for Kentucky munis decreases from Dk0 to Dk1, decreasing
the price (with this decrease in demand the yields for Kentucky bonds would
increase). The decrease in demand also causes a change in the quantity of
Kentucky bonds held by Kentuckians as represented by the movement from
Qk0 to Qk1. . The new equilibrium price for Kentucky bonds will be Pk1
The demand for non-Kentucky munis increases from Dnk0 to Dnk1, increas-
ing the price and decreasing the yields. The increase in demand also causes
a change in the quantity of non-Kentucky bonds held by Kentuckians as rep-
resented by the movement from Qnk0 to Qnk1. The new equilibrium price
for non-Kentucky bonds will be Pnk1. The new equilibrium price will be the
same for both the Kentucky muni and non Kentucky muni markets since
the uniform tax treatment abolishes market segmentation (Pk1 = Pnk1).
If the state were to choose to tax both their own bonds and the bonds
of other municipalities, that would have the additional impact of making
corporate bonds relatively more attractive to Kentucky investors. This is
due to the narrowing of the eﬀective yield between a corporate bond and a
municipal bond by eliminating the state tax exemption of municipal bonds.
3.1 Potential market response to Davis v. Department of
Revenue
A similar equation can be used to determine the cost of capital from the
state and local governments’ perspectives. For this discussion we ﬁrst as-
sume bonds issued by states are identical except in their tax treatment.
Furthermore, the states with double tax exemption for municipal bonds cre-
ates a strong incentive for residents to invest in intrastate bonds, creating a
market segmentation by state.
The tax exemption is a direct subsidy to the cost of capital for state
and local government. In particular, the marginal income tax rates at the
federal and state level determine the reduction in bond yields, and therefore
9borrowing costs for the state. The relationship between tax rates and bond
yields is given in 3.
Yei = Y (1 − tf − tsi) (3)
Y would be the yield on a municipal bond in the absence of any exemptions
at the federal or state level. Yei is the after tax yield on a municipal bond
given the exemption for both the federal tax and state i. The marginal
federal tax rate is tf , and tsi is the marginal tax rate for state i. We can
rewrite Equation 3 after distributing Y through on the right side of the
equation as
Yei = Y − Y tf − Y tsi (4)
Assuming that the federal exemption will impact all states equally, we treat
Y − Y tf as a constant (C). Therefore
Yei = C − Y tsi (5)
The expression in 5 can be used to compare the after tax yields between two
states with diﬀerent marginal tax rates assuming market segmentation. For
two given states i=1,2, then
Ye1 > Ye2 when
C − Y ts1 > C − Y ts2 substituting from 5 then
ts1 < ts2 subtract C and divide by -Y
Thus the yield on municipal bonds issued from state 1 will be higher
than the yield on (comparable) bonds from state 2 only when the marginal
state income tax rate in state 2 is more than state 1. As long as the mar-
ket remains segmented for municipal bonds that qualify for the double tax
exemption, then yield diﬀerentials will persist. Empirical evidence for the
market segmentation shows that Texas municipal bonds are penalized with
higher yields because the state does not tax personal income.22
The implication of the Davis v Department of Revenue case is that states
cannot tax instate bonds diﬀerently from out of state bonds and therefore
the market segmentation motivated by the double income tax beneﬁt would
be eliminated. As noted previously, if the ruling in the case stands, then
22Clarke, Wes and Robert L. Bland, 2000, “State Guarantees for School Debt and the
Texas Penalty,” Municipal Finance Journal 21(2):1-12.
10states would have two options: exempt all municipal bond interest, or tax
all municipal bond interest. The removal of the state market segmentation
could have a dramatic impact on municipal bond yields in some states.
For the ﬁrst scenario consider that all states (with a state income tax)
tax interest on municipal bonds. Non preferential tax treatment eliminates
the market segmentation by state and drawing from 3, the new equilibrium
after tax yield, Ye∗, shown in equation 6 will be determined by the federal
marginal tax rate alone since states will no longer exempt municipal bond
interest income from taxation the marginal state tax rate drops out of the
equation.
Ye∗ = Y (1 − tf) (6)
Without the state income tax exemption the municipal bond yields would
increase for all states except those without a state income tax. The amount
that yields would increase for an individual state would be given by ∆ as
deﬁned
∆ = Ye∗ − Yei (7)
∆ = Y (1 − tf) − Y (1 − tf − tsi) using equations 6 and 4
∆ = Y tsi
The magnitude of the yield increase and thereby the cost of capital for
a state is driven by the marginal tax rate for the state. A state without an
income tax would not expect an increase in the cost of capital because there
was not a double exemption prior to the change in tax exemptions. States
with a high marginal tax rate currently beneﬁt from a greater cost of capital
subsidy and after the change would therefore see a greater increase in the
cost of capital.
The second scenario considers that all states will exempt interest on
municipal bonds from state income tax. In this case the state marginal
tax rates will still inﬂuence the after tax rate on municipal bonds, but mu-
nicipal bonds from any state will be exempt. Therefore the state market
segmentation is eliminated since there is no preferential tax treatment (just
diﬀerences in tax rates). Maintaining the state exemption across the board
would create a scenario where arbitrage produces a market wide after-tax
yield equilibrium in which some states are clearly winners and others are
clearly losers. The new market wide equilibrium is expressed:




Where Ys∗ is the new equilibrium after tax yield on municipal bonds. The
summation expresses the weighted average marginal state tax rate using tsi
and ωi as the proportion of the total bond market issued by or within state
i. Drawing on equation 7, the change in individual state bond yields can be
measured as shown in equation 9. For convenience let the weighted average
tax rate for the 50 states be represented by twa.
∆ = Ys∗ − Yei (9)
∆ = Y (1 − tf − twa) − Y (1 − tf − tsi) using equations 8 and 4
∆ = Y (tsi − twa)
If the change in ∆ is greater than zero the state will experience increased
cost of capital in the non segmented equilibrium. The opposite is true for a
negative change ∆. The direction and magnitude of the change in the cost
of capital for a state is driven by how the marginal tax rate for the state
compares to the weighted average for all states. If the individual tax rate
is less than the weighted average, then the change is negative and the state
cost of capital will be lower under the new equilibrium. To illustrate, con-
sider Tennessee bonds. There is no income tax in Tennessee and therefore
tsi is zero. In absence of market segmentation, Tennessee should experi-
ence lower bond yields because of increased demand for Tennessee bonds by
nonresidents. On the other hand, the bond yields for a high tax state like
California would increase due to less demand for California bonds given the
higher yields available on bonds issued from other states. In other words,
states with a high marginal tax rate beneﬁt from a greater subsidy for the
cost of capital under segmented markets and experience a greater increase
in the cost of capital in the new market equilibrium.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 demonstrates the relative eﬀects of removing the preferential
tax treatment for municipal bond interest. The change in bond yields in the
second column from the right represents the change in the cost of capital for
the state. This scenario looks only at the impact of the tax exempt eﬀect, by
holding the taxable yield constant across the states. In other words, the same
bond issued by all the states would have the diﬀerent yields in diﬀerent states
12prior to tax harmonization. After tax harmonization the after tax yield of
that bond would be the same for all 50 states. The change in yield com-
pares the pre harmonization yields to the post harmonization yields. The
scenario demonstrates that states with high marginal state income tax rates
will exhibit relatively larger increases in the cost of capital. These states
include California, Maine, Minnesota, Oregon, and Rhode Island. On the
other hand, states like Alaska, Florida, South Dakota, Tennessee and Texas
without a state income tax will experience proportionally larger decreases in
bond yields. A caveat on Table 1 is that bond yield changes shown are the
result of just the market segmentation and marginal tax rates. Credit risk,
maturity, across segmentation investing, bond insurance and other factors
will determine the actual cost of capital post tax harmonization.
There is also the scenario that states will not react uniformly in tax
treatment of municipal bonds. According to the Bond Market Association,23
there are currently a number of states that exempt other state’s municipal
bonds (at least certain categories) from taxation in addition to exempting
their own bonds from taxation. For a few states this is the result of them not
taxing personal income. The following states do not have a personal income
tax and do not tax municipal bonds-Alaska, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas,
Washington and Wyoming.24 Additionally, two states with personal income
taxes-Indiana and Utah-employ reciprocal policies and do not tax bonds
issued in other states where their own bonds are not taxed, nor do they
tax their own bonds. Other states like Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma,
and Wisconsin may tax some of their own bonds in addition to other state’s
bonds. There are similar divisions when looking at the corporate income
tax and the treatment of municipal bonds. The yield implications would
be mixed and given the mobility of capital invested in municipal bonds the
mixed tax treatment could be very distortionary to the market yields.
4 Revenue Impacts
Using available data, we are able to estimate the revenue loss for some state
that would be experienced if the result of Davis v. Department of Revenue
leads states to exempt interest on all municipal bonds. For the state of New
York25 in 2003, there were 97,068 individuals that reported state and local
23http://www.investinginbonds.com/learnmore.asp?catid=8&subcatid=53&id=225
24Although Florida does not have an income tax, they do tax other state’s municipal
bonds through an intangible property tax. The intangible property tax, however had been
repealed for 2007 http://www.myﬂorida.com/dor/taxes/ippt.html.
25New York Department of Taxation and Finance, 2003, Analysis of 2003 PTI Returns.
13bond interest from bonds issued by other states. The total amount of interest
income reported on these bonds was $636.4 million. To estimate the revenue
loss, we multiplied the amount of interest income claimed by each NY AGI
class by the New York state tax rate for that AGI class.26 The estimated
revenue loss for New York is $45.8 million.27 Similar estimation was done
for Colorado, Connecticut, and Oregon. In 1999,28 Colorado29 had 38,502
returns ﬁled with interest income from out of state municipal bonds. The
total amount of interest income from these bonds was $239.9 million; the
estimated revenue loss is $11.1 million. The situation in Oregon30 is similar
to that of Colorado. In 2004, the state had 30,318 individuals report inter-
est income on government bonds from other states. The amount of interest
income earned was $98.1 million, and revenue loss is estimated to be $8.5
million. In Connecticut,31 the amount of interest income claimed on state
and local obligations that do not originate with Connecticut is $1,214 mil-
lion; the state also reports the “Mutual fund exempt-interest dividends from
non-Connecticut state or municipal government obligations” which came to
$208.5 million. The estimated revenue loss to Connecticut from these two
sources of income is $70.9 million
Other states provide some information as to the potential costs of these
activities. Kansas32 reports that 26,460 ﬁlers claim income from “state and
municipal bond interest not speciﬁcally exempt from Kansas income tax”
and that taxing this income enhances state revenue by $7.1 million
5 Conclusion
This paper has focused on a few of the issues and implications of a current
court, Davis v. Department of Revenue, with respect to the potential elim-
ination of a state’s tax preference for the bonds they issue. In addition to
26To make the estimates conservative, we used applied tax rates from joint ﬁlers. Under
this scenario the marginal tax rates increase less quickly than they do for single ﬁlers. To
demonstrate, an individual with income between $20-$25 thousand faces a 6.85% marginal
tax rate if he is a single ﬁler, while if the individual, with the same level of income is a
joint ﬁler the applicable marginal tax rate would be 5.90%.
27Alternately, this is an estimate of state revenue that was collected by taxing out-of-
state municipal bonds.
28The most recent year with available data.
29Colorado Department of Revenue, 1999, Colorado Statistics of Income, Table 10.
30Oregon Department of Revenue, 2004, 2004 Personal Income Tax Statistics.
31Connecticut Department of Revenue Services, 2005, 2004 Personal Income Tax Statis-
tics
32Kansas Department of Revenue, 2004,Tax Expenditure Report, pg. 4.
14providing some legal background and context for the current case, the paper
addresses two key implications of this case. First, the paper presented a ba-
sic simulation of how yields would respond, across the states, under diﬀerent
state responses to the current case. This basic model suggests that bonds
issued by states with higher marginal tax rates would see the yields increase
on their obligations while states with lower than average marginal tax rates
would see their yields decline. The yields would converge at new market
equilibrium due to the elimination of tax preferences across the states. Sec-
ond, the paper oﬀers preliminary estimates of the direct revenue impact to
states if they are no longer able to collect taxes from income earned on bonds
issued by other states. These basic estimates suggest a good deal of variance
in how much revenue each state will lose.
Other important issues that are not explicitly addressed in this paper
include the change in the cost of bringing new issues to the market. In a
post-Davis world the price that state and local governments pay to ﬁnance
their capital projects would adjust due to the elimination of the current
tax preference. Additionally, the market for state and local bonds would
change dramatically. The trend in recent years has been toward more spe-
cialized bond funds that cater to speciﬁc sets of state investors. If the states’
tax-exemption disappears, the market for municipal bonds will grow to a na-
tional market, where issuers must be able to compete with across the states.
The signal that investors get from credit ratings may become relatively more
important as the potential market investors can choose from expands.
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Figure 1:  The effect on demand for Kentucky bonds should all municipal bond interest 
be tax exempt 
 
 
Figure 2: The effect on demand for non-Kentucky bonds should all municipal bond 
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Alabama   3.25  0.0112 34.91 4.268 4.177  -0.091  -0.0213
Alaska   0  0.0045 36.05 4.413 4.177  -0.236  -0.0536
Arizona   4.93  0.0156 34.32 4.192 4.177  -0.016  -0.0037
Arkansas   7.21  0.0054 33.53 4.09 4.177 0.087  0.0214
California   9.86  0.1409 32.6 3.971 4.177 0.206  0.0519
Colorado   4.77  0.0174 34.38 4.199 4.177  -0.022  -0.0053
Connecticut   5  0.0157 34.3 4.189 4.177  -0.012  -0.0029
Delaware   6.13  0.0032 33.91 4.138 4.177  0.039  0.0094
Florida   0  0.0567 36.05 4.413 4.177  -0.236  -0.0536
Georgia   5.83  0.0179 34.01 4.152 4.177 0.025  0.0061
Hawaii   8.04  0.0047 33.23 4.053 4.177  0.124  0.0306
Idaho   7.89  0.0021 33.29 4.059 4.177  0.118  0.029
Illinois   3  0.0533 35 4.279 4.177  -0.102  -0.0238
Indiana   3.4  0.0146 34.86 4.261 4.177 -0.084  -0.0197
Iowa   6.06  0.0059 33.93 4.141 4.177  0.036  0.0086
Kansas   6.51  0.0083 33.77 4.121 4.177  0.056  0.0135
Kentucky   6.18  0.0152 33.89 4.136 4.177 0.041  0.0099
Louisiana   3.92  0.0115 34.68 4.237 4.177  -0.06  -0.0142
Maine   8.76  0.0036 32.99 4.02 4.177  0.157  0.0391
Maryland   4.83  0.0143 34.36 4.197 4.177 -0.02  -0.0047
Massachusetts   5.3  0.0361 34.19 4.176 4.177  0.001  0.0003
Michigan   3.9  0.0293 34.69 4.238 4.177  -0.061  -0.0144
Minnesota   8.09  0.0173 33.22 4.05 4.177  0.127  0.0313
Mississippi   4.93  0.0053 34.32 4.192 4.177 -0.016  -0.0037
Missouri   5.91  0.0158 33.98 4.148 4.177 0.029  0.0069
Montana   7.11  0.0022 33.56 4.094 4.177 0.082  0.0201
Nebraska   7.65  0.0045 33.37 4.07 4.177  0.107  0.0262
Nevada   0  0.0093 36.05 4.413 4.177  -0.236  -0.0536
New Hampshire   0  0.0042 36.05 4.413 4.177  -0.236  -0.0536
New Jersey   6.37  0.0325 33.82 4.128 4.177 0.049 0.012
New Mexico   5.55  0.005 34.11 4.164 4.177  0.013  0.0031
New York   7.25  0.1114 33.51 4.088 4.177  0.089  0.0217
Shaded state indicates bond yields would decrease.       
* Amount of basis points that the average state yields will increase (decrease) in the new equilibrium.   
Weighted average state income tax rate:  5.268       
Weighted average federal income tax rate:  34.206       
Assumes a taxable yield of 6.901 (estimated using average market values for equation #1)        18




























North Carolina   8.5  0.0198 33.08 4.032 4.177 0.145 0.036
North Dakota   5.41  0.0016 34.16 4.17 4.177 0.007  0.0016
Ohio   7.18  0.0292 33.54 4.091 4.177  0.086  0.021
Oklahoma   6.29  0.0069 33.85 4.131 4.177  0.046  0.0111
Oregon   9.1  0.0125 32.87 4.005 4.177  0.172  0.043
Pennsylvania   3.07  0.0497 34.98 4.275 4.177 -0.098 -0.023
Rhode Island   9.28  0.0043 32.8 3.997 4.177  0.18  0.045
South Carolina   7.09  0.0133 33.57 4.095 4.177 0.082  0.02
South Dakota   0  0.002 36.05 4.413 4.177 -0.236  -0.0536
Tennessee   0  0.0124 36.05 4.413 4.177  -0.236  -0.0536
Texas   0  0.071 36.05 4.413 4.177  -0.236  -0.0536
Utah   6.14  0.0072 33.9 4.138 4.177  0.039  0.0094
Vermont   8.5  0.0017 33.07 4.032 4.177  0.145  0.0359
Virginia   5.83  0.0208 34.01 4.152 4.177  0.025  0.0061
Washington   0  0.0261 36.05 4.413 4.177  -0.236  -0.0536
Washington DC   9.1  0.0034 32.87 4.005 4.177 0.172 0.043
West Virginia   6.5  0.0043 33.77 4.122 4.177 0.055  0.0133
Wisconsin   6.75  0.0179 33.69 4.11 4.177  0.067  0.0162
Wyoming   0  0.001 36.05 4.413 4.177 -0.236  -0.0536
           
Shaded state indicates bond yields would decrease.       
* Amount of basis points that the average state yields will increase (decrease) in the new equilibrium.   
Weighted average state income tax rate:  5.268       
Weighted average federal income tax rate:  34.206       
Assumes a taxable yield of 6.901 (estimated using average market values for equation #1)      
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